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Abstract:  We ask whether conformity, copying the most observed 
behavior in a population, can affect free riding in a public goods 
situation.  Our model suggests that, if free riding is sufficiently frequent 
at the start of a public goods game, conformity will increase the growth 
rate of free riding.  We confirm this prediction in the experimental lab by 
showing that more free riding occurs when players have information 
about the distribution of contributions than when players know only the 
aggregate contribution level.  As a stricter test, we econometrically 
estimate the dynamic on which the model is based and find that, 
controlling for the payoff incentive to free ride, players react significantly 
to the number of free riders in their groups.  Further, conformity is 
significantly stronger when players have more information about the 
choices of others.  
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According to psychologists, conformity - the tendency to copy the most 
prevalent behavior in a population - is a particularly strong and robust 
predictor of human behavior (see the reviews of Moscovici [1985] and 
Cialdini and Trost [1998]).  However, conformity is largely ignored in 
economic models of human behavior which focus, mostly, on the pursuit 
of material well-being.
1  Obviously, the situations where conformity 
might improve economic predictions are limited to scenarios where 
behavior is public and people can observe what others do.  However, 
isolating economically important situations where conformity may play a 
role is not as simple as identifying situations in which decisions are made 
publicly because we must also consider why people conform.   
Traditionally, there are two reasons that people conform: (1) to 
avoid sanctions for deviating from norms, and (2) to take advantage of 
the information acquired and processed by others (Deutsch and Gerard 
[1955]).
2  Previous research suggests that when economic decisions 
generate externalities that either benefit or harm other people (i.e. social 
dilemmas), those who are affected are typically adept at figuring out the 
actions of others and at sanctioning the people who make decisions that 
violate widely-held norms of cooperation.
3  In these situations people 
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1 Interesting exceptions include Bowles [1998] on the endogenous formation of 
preferences and Anderson and Holt [1997] on information cascades. 
2 People may also conform to be better liked (Hatfield et al. [1993]) but this 
reason might just be a rationalization of norm compliance. 
3 Acheson [1988] is a fascinating and well documented example of lobster fishing 
in Maine. For laboratory evidence of punishing deviations from a norms see Fehr 
and Gaechter [2000b].   4 
conform to evolved conventions to avoid being sanctioned. 
  People may also conform when they lack information about what 
the most beneficial action to take is or when they think they lack 
important information.  In this case conformity is based on the perceived 
benefit of imitation.  When presented with a new environment, the 
simple heuristic of copy the most prevalent behavior often pays off 
because copiers minimize the cognitive costs of gathering and analyzing 
information, while benefiting from the lessons learned by others (Tversky 
and Kahneman [1974], Cialdini [1993]). 
  One economically important situation in which people might feel 
they lack important information and/or fear sanctions for making 
inappropriate decisions is the provision of a public good.  While the 
incentives involved in the provision of public goods (see Bergstrom et al. 
[1986]) appear straight-forward and assure that people will collectively 
contribute less that what would be socially optimal, to naïve decision 
makers it might not be obvious what the payoff maximizing contribution 
level is.  For example, the fact that average contributions in many 
treatments of (theoretically straight-forward) linear public goods games 
start between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment is consistent with the 
hypothesis that participants are initially uncertain about what to do and 
simply try half-half to see what happens (Ledyard [1995]).  Further, as 
demonstrated in Carpenter et al. [2001], Gintis [2000], and Sethi [1996], 
public goods games provide an environment in which sanctioning norm 
violators can and does evolve both in the lab and theoretically. 
While the conforming effect of sanctions has been studied 
extensively and the role of being unfamiliar with the incentives of public 
goods has been examined to a lesser degree (Andreoni [1988]; Andreoni 
[1995]), there has been little economic research that isolates the non-  5 
punishment, or imitation, role of conformity in the provision of a public 
good.
4 
  What follows is an empirical study of conformity in the standard 
public goods experiment, the voluntary contribution mechanism or VCM 
(Isaac et al. [1984]).  We begin by creating a model of conformity.  The 
model is important because it provides us with both a baseline prediction 
when no conformity is present and an alternative prediction that 
accounts for the imitative effect of conformity.  We then discuss the 
results of an experiment.  The first experimental condition is a 
traditional VCM which we use as a control.  The treatment modifies the 
standard VCM to allow, more explicitly, for the expression of conformity.  
We then estimate our model econometrically and find significantly more 
conformity in the treatment.  
 
Modeling the Effect of Conformity on the Provision of a Public Good 
 
Consider a large population of agents who are randomly repaired each 
period to play the following public goods game in groups of size n.  
Agents are “hard-wired” to either contribute to the public good or not 
and strategies survive (i.e. persist or grow in the population) to the 
extent that they return higher material benefits than that accruing to the 
strategy used by the average agent.
5  Agents are endowed with e resource 
units that can either be all contributed to the public good or all kept.  
Each unit contributed returns benefits of 0<m<1 to all the members of 
                                                 
4 There are, however, a few papers on the more general topic of conformity in 
social dilemmas in psychology (e.g. Parks et al. [2001], Schroeder et al. [1983]). 
5 A more complicated “social learning” story can be told based on agents who are 
not “hard-wired” but instead compare outcomes to aspiration levels and switch 
strategies when dissatisfied.  However, as shown in Gale et al. [1995], such a story 
is largely equivalent to the simpler, shorter, story that follows.   6 
the group while kept units only benefit the free rider.
6  If we denote p as 
the fraction of free riders in the population we can calculate the expected 
payoff for the two strategies: contribute and free ride.  The expected 
payoffs to contributing, πc, and to free riding, πfr, when there are p free 
riders in the population are: 
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(1 ) ( 1)
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Notice, both payoffs are decreasing in the number of free riders and the 
payoff to free riding dominates the payoff to contributing for any value 
of p.  This defines the game as a standard linear public goods problem. 
  As we stated above, we will allow the population to evolve 
according to the standard replicator dynamic (Taylor and Jonker [1978], 
Maynard Smith [1982]) under which the growth rate of a strategy 
depends on the differential benefit the strategy confers on agents when 
compared to the payoff received by the average agent.  In discrete time, 















Where  11 (1 ) tf r t c pp ππ π −− =+ −  is the average payoff.  Because the 
denominator does not determine the fixed points of the dynamic, we 
consider the simpler version, 
 
                                                 
6 This baseline model is very similar to Miller and Andreoni [1991] except Miller 
and Andreoni allow a larger strategy space (i.e. the contribution decision is not 
binary).  As we will see, controlling for the return on the public good and the size 
of groups, our simpler binary choice game provides nearly identical time paths.   7 
11 () ttf r t p pp ππ −− =− + 
 
This sort of public goods game conducted in the experimental lab 
would, for example, allocate five persons to a group (n=5), assign a 
marginal per capita return from the public good of three quarters of each 
contribution (m=0.75), and give players an endowment of 20 
experimental monetary units or EMUs (e=20).  Substituting these values 
into the payoffs to contributing and free riding, calculating the average 
payoff, and after some algebra we arrive at: 
 
11 1 (1 )(5) tt t t p pp p −− − =− +  
 
The time paths of this dynamic mimic the standard increase in free 
riding we see in many VCM experiments (see Ledyard [1995]).  Figure 1 
plots the time paths (in continuous time) from different initial 
conditions.  Notice, as pointed out in Miller and Andreoni [1991], 
allowing strategies to evolve generates behavioral time paths that mimic 
the growth of free riding in actual laboratory experiments. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Now we ask what happens if people conform.  While there are 
many functional forms that we could use to represent conformity, we will 
only consider what we call the class of “cubic” functions represented in 
figure 2.
 7   
 
                                                 
7 In related work, Henrich and Boyd [2001] use the linear conformity function, 
2( 1) 11 pp p t tt =+ − −−.    8 
Figure 2 about here 
 
We limit our analysis to cubic conformity functions for two 
reasons.  One, cubic functions can be constructed such that  0 p ∆<  when 
free riders represent less than half the population and  0 p ∆>  when free 
riders make up more than half the population.  Second, to assure the 
dynamic never “runs off the strategy simplex,” we also limit our choice 
to cubic functions which have rest points at p=0 and p=1.  Let  1 () t cp −  
be one member of this class of conformity functions, in which case, we 
can combine the incentive to conform with the payoff incentive to free 
ride by assuming that the strength of conformity can be measured by a 
parameter,  01 α ≤≤ .  Under this assumption the population now evolves 
according to: 
 
11 1 (1 )[ ( )] ( ) tt f r t t p pc p p απ π α −− − =− − + +  
 
  Figure 3 is drawn with 
23
111 1 ( ) 60 20 40 ttt t cp p p p −−− − =− − and 
0.5 α = .  As one can see, with sufficient conformity two important things 
happen to the time paths.  First, as shown in the two lower curves, if the 
initial frequency of free riding is small, and if conformity is strong enough 
a second fixed point arises in which all agents contribute.  Second, and 
more important for our purposes, with conformity, the growth rate of 
free riding increases when there are sufficiently many free riders at the 
start of the game.  Initially, the conformist dynamic causes free riding to 
grow slower near  1 0.5 t p − = because the effect of conformity at this 
population distribution is relatively low, but once there are sufficiently 
many free riders, the conformity effect exacerbates the payoff effect and 
free riding grows more rapidly than in the baseline model.  Hence, our 
prior is: if free riding is sufficiently common at the start of the game and   9 
conformity significantly affects contributions to a public good, we should 
see an increase in the growth rate of free riding as the game proceeds. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Testing For Conformity in the Experimental Lab 
 
To test for conformity we ran a VCM experiment with 10 sessions (5 for 
each treatment) and 165 participants who earned 16.14 dollars, on 
average, including a 5 dollar show-up fee.  In each of ten periods 
participants were randomly shuffled into groups of five.  This is the 
familiar  strangers condition (Keser and van Winden [2000], Croson 
[1996], Andreoni [1988]).  We used the strangers condition to control, as 
much as possible, for any strategic or conditionally cooperative reasons 
that may influence participant choices; doing so allows us to focus on 
conformity.  We also used the strangers condition to match the 
conditions of the model (and the replicator dynamic) as closely as 
possible. 
  As in figure 1, in the experiment each EMU contributed returned 
0.75 EMUs for each of the five members of the group.  With an 
endowment of 20 EMUs, the payoff function for the experiment was: 
 
(20 ) 0.75 ii i
i
xx π =− + ∑  
 
where  i π  and  i x  are the payoff and contribution of the i th group 
member (i=1,2,3,4,5), respectively.  Differentiating  i π  with respect to  i x  
illustrates that contributing nothing is the dominant strategy, but 
differentiating with respect to  i i x ∑ shows that the social optimum 
occurs when everyone contributes fully.   10
 In  the  control treatment, participants were first asked to decide 
how to allocate their 20 EMU endowment between the public good and 
their own personal accounts.  After everyone had made the allocation 
decision, each individual was shown three pieces of information: the 
individual’s contribution, how much the individual’s group contributed in 
total, and the individual’s payoff for the period.
8  Hence, participants in 
the control only knew how much the group contributed in total – they 
did not know what the other group members had contributed 
individually.  The monitor treatment proceeded identically to the control 
treatment except the information participants were shown after deciding 
on contribution levels was augmented by the individual contribution 
decisions of all the other current group members (however individual 
identities were never revealed). 
In the monitor treatment participants could see the distribution 
of contribution choices rather than just the group total contribution.   
Knowing the distribution gives players the information necessary for 
conformity to play a stronger role.  For example, when players know only 
the group total contribution, a situation in which two of the other group 
members contribute fully and the other two free ride fully is identical to 
the situation where each other group member contributes 10 EMUs.   
Using the same example, for a conformist who knows the distribution of 
choices the first scenario is perplexing because the group is split half 
contributors and half free riders, but in the latter scenario it is obvious 
what conforming means. 
What happens in this experiment?  Figure 4 plots the average 
fraction of EMUs kept in the two treatments for each period of the 
experiment.  In both treatments average contributions start at 
approximately 50% of the endowment.  The control treatment replicates 
                                                 
8 At the second stage of each period the information from all pervious periods 
was also listed.   11
the results of other VCM experiments in which the marginal per capita 
return from the public good is 0.75 (Isaac et al. [1984]); specifically, free 
riding increases, but slowly.  Compared to the control, in the monitor 
treatment free riding grows faster.
9  F u r t h e r ,  a s  i n  t h e  m o d e l  ( r e c a l l  
figure 3) the conformist treatment cuts the control treatment from below 
and then elicits more free riding faster.  This result alone is evidence 
favoring a significant conformity effect. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
  One, more formal, way to test for conformity is to check whether 
the distribution of EMUs kept in period ten looks similar to the 
distribution in the previous nine periods.  That is, if players conform we 
would expect the distribution of EMUs kept in period 10 would look very 
much like the distribution in periods one through nine.  Further, the 
more conformity, the closer the two distributions should be.  In figure 5 
we present four histograms, two for the distribution of EMUs kept in 
periods one through nine and two for the distributions in period ten.  As 
one can see by the end of ten periods, the control treatment appears to 
bifurcate decisions much more than the monitor treatment.  Participants 
in the control are most likely to keep none of the endowment or three 
quarters of it, while the participants in the monitor treatment are 
distributed much closer to the average contribution.
10   
                                                 
9  Overall, EMUs kept in the monitor treatment are distributed significantly 
higher than in the control.  Defining an observation as the session average 
contribution in a period and testing for differences in central tendencies we get 
z=2.13, p=0.03.  Testing for differences in the cumulative distributions we get 
ks=0.30, p=0.02. 
10 In fact in period ten the variance of behavior in the control is nearly twice as 
high as in the monitor treatment (compare 56.50 to 29.51).   12
To test how close the period ten distributions are to the periods 
one through nine distributions we used the Komogornov-Smirnov test 
(see Siegel and Castellan [1988]) which tests for differences in cumulative 
distributions.  According to this test the two distributions in the control 
treatment are significantly different (KS=0.19, p=0.01) indicating less 
conformity in the control treatment.  However, in the monitor treatment 
the two distributions are statistically indistinguishable (KS=0.13, 
p=0.14) suggesting more conformity.  We now proceed to bolster the 
case for conformity with a more sophisticated statistical argument. 
 
Measuring the Effect of Conformity Econometrically 
 
As a more rigorous test of conformity we econometrically estimated our 
model to see if the key behavioral determinants, the differential benefit of 
free riding and the frequency of free riders, influenced the contribution 
choices of our participants.  We also tested whether the monitor 
treatment elicited more conformity. 
  All the results we report are from regressing the number of 
EMUs a person kept in period t on the frequency of free riders in the 
person’s group in period t-1, on the differential payoff accruing to free 
riders in period t-1, and on the EMUs a person kept in period t-1.  We 
measure the free rider’s payoff differential as the average payoff received 
by a free rider minus the average payoff received by players overall 
within each period and session.  To test the robustness of our results, we 
measure free riding in three different ways: contributing 1/4 of the 
endowment or less, contributing 1/3 of the endowment or less, and 
contributing 1/2 the endowment or less.  To prevent our results from 
being biased by the fact that contributions are bound between 0 and 20, 
we use the tobit procedure.  Lastly, to control for individual specific 
heterogeneity, we include random effects.   13
Table 1 is a simple test of whether something that we might 
loosely call conformity - a response to the frequency of free riding that is 
independent of the payoff motivation to free ride – is present in our data.  
Interestingly, within our pooled data we see that, controlling for how 
much one free rode last period, all the increase in free riding can be 
attributed to conformity; the payoff incentive to free ride contributes 
effectively nothing to one’s contribution decision.
11  Further, the 
conformity effect is invariant to the definition of free riding.  Under each 
definition of free riding we see a significant influence of conformity – the 
more free riders there were last period, the more individuals free ride this 
period. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In table 2 we ask, for each free riding definition, whether either 
the payoff motive to free ride or the conformist motive to free ride has a 
differential effect in the monitor treatment.  Under none of the free 
riding definitions are participants significantly more responsive to the 
material incentive to free ride in the monitor treatment than in the 
control treatment (i.e. the free rider differential by monitor interaction is 
never significant).  However, as hypothesized, conformity is stronger 
when participants are given the full distribution of what other players in 
                                                 
11 Note, one should expect a strong correlation between the free rider’s payoff 
differential and the frequency of free riders and that the resulting colinearity 
might cause the free rider’s differential to predict poorly.  However, because of 
how the free rider’s differential is defined (i.e. expected free rider payoff minus 
the average payoff) we measured the free rider’s differential at the session level 
while we measured the frequency of free riding at the group level.  As a result, 
the correlation is never greater than  0.33 ρ =− .  Further, dropping the frequency 
from the regressions in table 1 does not substantially increase the size or 
significance of the free rider differential indicating that colinearity is not driving 
the result.   14
their groups are doing (i.e. the frequency by monitor interaction is 
significant in all cases). 
The size and significance of the differential conformity effect 
depends on the definition of free riding.  As the definition of free riding 
loosens, the differential effect of conformity in the monitoring treatment 
increases.  This increase grows to the point where conformity is 
approximately 10% stronger in the monitor treatment when we use the 
contribute 1/2 or less definition of free riding. 
We also see that (controlling for treatment differences) the effect 
of the material incentive to free ride becomes stronger and more 
significant as we loosen the definition of free riding.  In fact, using either 
the contribute 1/3 or less or the contribute 1/2 or less definition the 
replicator dynamic fits our data rather well.  The higher the material 
incentive to free ride last period, the more people free ride this period, 
and the more free riders there were last period, the more people free ride 
this period, the later effect being stronger when more information about 
free riding is provided. 
 




The model presented above and the experiment designed to test the 
model’s predictions demonstrate that conformity may be an important 
economic phenomenon in social dilemma situations such as the provision 
of a public good.  Conformity may be important because it helps sustain 
contributions when they start at sufficiently high levels.  More 
importantly however, as demonstrated by the current experiment, 
conformity is important because it can account for why cooperation 
might wane faster than standard theories based on boundedly rational   15
agents (e.g. the replicator dynamic) would suggest.  As the number of 
free riders increases, conformity provides an additional incentive (or 
excuse) to free ride.  This also implies that when conformity is present, 
trying to initiate contributions in a population of free riders will be even 
harder than first thought. 
  These results suggest a possible confound for explanations of the 
dynamics seen in public goods experiments based on the specific idea of 
conditional cooperation or, more generally, reciprocity. Conditional 
cooperation (Andreoni [1988], Keser and van Winden [2000]) 
hypothesizes that players are predisposed to contribute in social 
dilemmas, but become frustrated by free riders and punish them by 
withholding future contributions.  Conditional cooperation predicts the 
type of gradual decline in contributions seen in many public goods 
experiments where players stay in the same group for the entire 
experiment (i.e. the partners protocol). 
  However, conditional cooperation makes little sense when groups 
are randomly reshuffled after each period (i.e. the strangers protocol) 
because it is not clear why people would punish future group members 
who, in all likelihood, will be different from those who free rode in earlier 
periods.  That is, when players do not stay in the same group, there is no 
reason to punish future group members and therefore there is no dynamic 
reducing contributions.  Yet, as seen in Fehr and Gaechter [2000a] and 
Fehr and Gaechter [2000b] the growth rates of free riding under three 
matching protocols, partners, strangers and complete strangers, where 
players know they will never be in a group with the same people again, 
can be ordered from slowest to fastest growth, partners < strangers < 
complete strangers. 
  Conformity, on the other hand, predicts equally well under any 
matching protocol.  If naïve participants search for clues from their 
fellow group mates and make decisions partially on the payoff benefit a   16
strategy returns and partially on trying to take advantage of what others 
have learned by imitating them, it matters little who is the group next 
period.  In addition, while conditional cooperation has a hard time 
explaining the decline in contributions under different matching 
protocols, the conformity explanation is straightforward.  Recalling 
figures 1 and 3, and the data of Keser and van Winden [2000], Fehr and 
Gaechter [2000b] and Fehr and Gaechter [2000a], free riding grows faster 
when players are less likely to meet each other in the future because 
there is more initial free riding when interactions are less likely to be 
repeated. 
   17
Participant Instructions (Monitor Treatment) 
 
You have been asked to participate in an economics experiment.  For 
participating today and being on time you have been paid $5.  You may 
earn an additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the 
experiment.  This money will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment.  By clicking the begin button you will be asked for some 
personal information.  After everyone enters this information we will 
start the instructions for the experiment. 
During the experiment we will speak in terms of Experimental 
Monetary Units, EMUs, instead of Dollars. Your payoffs will be 
calculated in terms of EMUs and then translated at the end of the 
experiment into dollars at the following rate: 30 EMUs = 1 Dollar 
The experiment is divided into 10 different periods.  In each 
period participants are divided into groups of 5.  You will therefore be in 
a group with 4 other participants. The composition of the groups will 
change randomly at the beginning of each period.  Therefore, in each 
period your group will consist of different participants. 
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages.  In the first 
stage you will decide how many EMUs you want to invest in each of two 
investment accounts.  One account is a Private Account, which only you 
benefit from.  The second account is a Public Account, the benefits of 
which are shared equally by all members of your group.  In the second 
stage of the period you will be shown the investment behavior of the 
other members of your group.  




At the beginning of every period each participant receives an 
endowment of 20 EMUs. You have to decide how much of this 
endowment you want to invest in each of the two accounts mentioned 
above.  You are asked to invest in whole EMU amounts (i.e. an 
investment of 5 EMUs is alright, but 3.75 should be rounded up to 4). 
To record your investment decision, you will type the amount of 
EMUs you want to invest in the Public and/or the Private account by 
typing in the appropriate text-input box which will be yellow.  Once you   18
have made your decision, there will be a green submit button that will 
record your investment decision. 
After all the members of your group have made their decisions, 
each of you will be informed of your earnings for the period.  Your 
earnings will consist of two parts: 
 
1 )      Yo ur ret urn o n your P riva t e Acco unt .  Yo ur P riva t e Account 
returns 1 EMU for each EMU invested.  That is, for each EMU invested 
in the Private Account you get 1 EMU back. 
 
2)     Your return from the Public Account.  Your earnings (and 
everyone else's in your group) is equal to 0.75 times the total investment 
by all members of the group to the Public Account. 
 
Your Earnings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1×(Investment in Private Account) + 0.75×(Group Total Investment in 
Public Account) 
 
The income of each group member from the Public Account is 
calculated the same way.  This means that each group member receives 
the same amount from the total investment in the Public Account.  For 
example, consider the case of groups with 5 members, if the total 
investment in the Public Account is 75 EMUs (e.g. first group member 
invests 15 EMUs, the second 20, the third 10 and the fourth and fifth 15 
each) then each group member will receive  0.75×75 =  56.25 EMUs.  If 
the total investment was 30 EMUs then each group member would 
receive 0.75×30 = 22.5 EMUs. 
For each EMU you invest in the Private Account you get 1 
EMU back.  Suppose however you invested this EMU in the Public 
Account instead.  Your income from the Public Account would increase 
by 0.75×1 = 0.75 EMUs.  At the same time the earnings of the other 
members of your group would also increase by 0.75 EMUs, so the total 
increase in the group's earnings would be 3.75 EMUs.  Your investment 
in the Public Account therefore increases the earnings of the other group 
members.  On the other hand your earnings increase for every EMU that 
the other members of your group invest in the Public Account.  For each   19




In stage two you will be shown the investment decisions made by 
the other members of your group.  You will be shown how much each 
member of your group invested in both the Public and Private Accounts.  
Your investment decision will also appear on the screen and will be 
labeled as 'YOU'. Please remember that the composition of your group 
will change at the beginning of each period and therefore you will not be 
looking at the same people all the time. 
When you have finished viewing the decisions made by the other 
people in your group click the blue done button.  When everyone is done, 
the experiment will proceed to the next period starting with stage one. 
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, 
click the red finished button when you are done reading. 
 
This is the end of the instructions. Be patient while everyone finishes 
reading.  20
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Fraction of Free Riders
 
Figure 3 - Evolution under the Conformist Dynamic (α=0.5, dashed 
curves indicate conformity, solid curves are reproduced from figure 1) 








































Figure 4 - Average Free Riding Levels in the VCM Experiment   24
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Figure 5a - Distribution of EMUs kept in the first 9 periods of the 
Control   25











Figure 5b - Distribution of EMUs kept in period 10 of the Control   26
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Figure 5c - Distribution of EMUs kept in the first 9 periods of the 
Monitor Treatment   27











Figure 5d - Distribution of EMUs kept in period 10 of the Monitor 
Treatment   28
 
 
Dependant Variable = EMUs Kept i,t  
(all results are tobit and include random effects) 
 




1/4 or less 
Contribute 
1/3 or less 
Contribute 
1/2 or less 
 







































2  118.51 130.18 118.84 
Prob > χ
2  <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. 
           i is individual, s is session, and t is period. 
           *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
           ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
           * significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 1 – Does Conformity Exist? 
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Dependant Variable = Number of EMUs Kept i,t 
(all results are tobit and include random effects) 
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2  123.24 136.45 128.38 
Prob > χ
2  < 0.01  < 0.01  < 0.01 
 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. 
           i is individual, s is session, and t is period. 
           *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
           ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
           * significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
Table 2 – Does Monitoring Elicit More Conformity?   30
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